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Abstract
In case of a product innovation firms start producing a new product. While doing so, such a firm
should decide what to do with its existing product after the firm has innovated. Essentially it can choose
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between replacing the established product by the new one, or keep on producing the established product
so that it produces two products at the same time.
The aim of this paper is to design a theoretical framework to analyze this problem. Due to tech-
nological progress the quality of the newest available technology, and thus the quality of the innovative
product that can be produced by this technology, increases over time. The implication is that a later
innovation enables the firm to produce a better innovative product. So, typically the firm faces the
tradeoff between innovating fast, which boosts its profits soon but only by a small amount, or innovating
later, which leads to a larger payoff increase. The drawback here is that the firm is stuck with producing
the established product for a longer time.
We find that a highly uncertain economic environment makes the firm delay abolishing the old product
market. But if the innovative market is more volatile, the firm enters the market sooner, provided it will
be active on the old market, at least for some time. Moreover, the smaller the initial demand for the
innovative product market, the better the quality of the innovative product needs to be for the product
innovation to be optimal.
1 Introduction
Technological progress implies that, as time passes, better technologies and therewith, also better products,
appear on the market. One of the questions is then: when should a firm invest in such technologies and
products, and what should the firm do with the existing ones? Should the firm keep producing old products,
or replace the old product when introducing a more innovative one? Essentially it can choose between
replacing the established production process by the new one (single rollover), or keep on producing the
established product so that it produces two products at the same time (dual rollover). The advantage of the
latter is that the firm earns revenue from both markets, but, if the innovative product is a strategic substitute
to the established product, the firm is competing with itself in the sense that growth of the innovative product
market will attract consumers that at the same time leave the established product market, or the other way
around. Also after initially choosing to simultaneously produce the established and the innovative product,
after some time it can be optimal to stop taking the established product into production due to the just
described cannibalization effects.
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The aim of this paper is to design a theoretical framework to analyze this problem. We start out with a
firm producing an established product. The firm has an option to carry out a product innovation. To do so
it has to adopt a new technology by which it can produce the innovative product. New technologies become
available as time passes. Due to technological progress the quality of the newest available technology, and
thus the quality of the innovative product that can be produced by this technology, increases over time,
albeit in a stochastic way, because the firm does not know beforehand how fast technologies will develop. To
capture this we impose that the technological progress is modelled by a Poisson process, where at discrete
moments in time the quality jumps upward. The implication is that a later innovation enables the firm
to produce a better innovative product, which will stimulate the innovative product demand and thus the
innovative product revenue. So, typically the firm faces the tradeoff between innovating fast that enlarges
its payoff soon but only by a small amount, or innovating later that leads to a larger payoff increase, the
drawback being that the firm is stuck with producing the established product for a longer time.
While perfectly being aware of the size of the demand of the established product, the firm does not know
beforehand how consumers will appreciate the innovative product and thus how demand of this product will
develop over time. Therefore, we assume that demand of the new product is also stochastic, such that the
output price satisfies a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process. A change in demand on the new market
directly influences the size of the cannibalization effect on the established market, so therefore we impose
that this cannibalization effect is also subject to the same GBM process.
Except from determining the optimal time to innovate, we also analyze the choice between the “add” and
the “replace” option, where the replace option reflects the possibility that at the innovation time the firm
stops producing the established product and begins producing the innovative product. The add option means
that after innovating the firm produces both the established and the innovative product. After deciding to
produce both products, the firm still has the option to stop producing the established product, which will
boost demand of the innovative product.
We now explain in what way we extend the existing literature. Farzin et al. [1998], Doraszelski [2001]
and Doraszelski [2004] focus on the time to innovate where technological progress develops stochastically
over time. The expected rate of new technologies arriving over time is constant, an assumption which is
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relaxed in Hagspiel et al. [2015]. Cho and McCardle [2009] consider a firm simultaneously using two types
of technologies and analyze the effect of their interdepencies on the timing of adopting upgrades. Smith and
Ulu [2012] allow for uncertainty in future costs of adoption. Murto [2007] considers the effect of revenue
uncertainty. Our paper also takes revenue uncertainty into account, but in addition to the just mentioned
papers we explicitly analyze how to go further with the established product market after innovating.
In Grenadier and Weiss [1997] different innovation strategies are outlined that take into account the
established technology, but to innovate or not is just a yes-or-no decision. The new technology has given
characteristics, so it is not taken into account that the newest technologies improve as time passes, as we do.
Reinganum [1981], Fudenberg and Tirole [1985], and Milliou and Petrakis [2011] determine the optimal
time to innovate in a framework where two firms have this innovation option, but their models are determin-
istic. Another difference with our work is that a process innovation that reduces costs is considered instead
of a product innovation. Stenbacka and Tombak [1994] add a new element to the literature on the timing
of adoption by explicitly taking the uncertainty in the length of time required for successful implementation
into consideration.
Huisman and Kort [2004] present a model with two firms that both can choose between adopting an
existing technology immediately or wait for a given new technology that is better than the old one, which
becomes available at some future unknown point in time.
Our work is closely related with Kwon [2010] and Hagspiel et al. [2016a], in the sense that we also study
the option to invest in a new product to boost the firm’s profit. But here we consider some remarkable
extensions. First, we assume that innovations occur according to a jump process, and therefore we have,
besides the (stochastic) price, the state of technology. The former authors also address the option to invest in
a new product, but there are no innovation events, being the price as the only stochastic variable. Moreover,
we include the option to produce both kinds of products until it is no longer optimal, and therefore the
established product stops being produced. We show that the firm has more incentive to first add the
innovative product to the product portfolio if demand volatility for the new product is high. In fact, the
option to replace increases with demand volatility. Therefore, the firm keeps this option alive for a longer
time if demand for the new product is more uncertain. If the interest rate is large, however, the firm is more
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inclined to replace the old product immediately.
Accounting for the option to eventually replace the old product, we find that the decision whether to add
the new product to the product portfolio or replace the old product immediately, has a crucial effect on
the innovation decision. We show that if the innovative market is more volatile, the firm enters the market
sooner, provided it will be active on the old market, at least for some time. This is due to the replace option
the firm gains after deciding to innovate, which increases in uncertainty, and therefore leads to a higher value
of investing. Furthermore, the smaller the initial demand for the innovative product, the better the quality
of the new product needs to be before it is optimal to innovate.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3 we derive
the optimal innovation policy and show the optimal time to replace the old product by new one. In this
section we also introduce a benchmark case, where the demand of the innovative product is assumed to be
deterministic, which serves us as reference point in the comparative statics presented in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 Model
Our model will consider a market for established and innovated products. The research questions we want
to deal with are, first, to establish the optimal time to innovate of the firm. Second, after the firm has
innovated, how long, if at all, the firm should be active on the established product market. In order to do so,
we keep our framework as simple as possible. Among others this requires that capacity sizes for the old and
the new product are treated as parameters. Later on, on top of our analytical comparative statics results, we
provide a numerical illustration showing how results determine on different capacity sizes of both products.
We consider an incumbent firm that is currently producing an established product with capacity K0. The
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firm produces up to capacity1. The price for the established product satisfies
p0 = ξ0 − αK0,
assuming that ξ0 > αK0, where ξ0 is the maximum willingness to pay for the established product and α > 0
is a constant parameter reflecting the sensitivity of the quantity with respect to the price. The instantaneous
profit on the established product market equals
π0 = (ξ0 − αK0)K0. (1)
As the firm produces up to capacity and therefore, the variable costs are constant, we simplify notation by
omitting these costs.
The firm has an option to innovate, i.e. to adopt a new technology by which it can produce a new
innovative product. To do so the firm has to incur an investment cost. We consider that this cost is
proportional to the capacity level of the new product, K1, specifically the cost is equal to δK1, with δ > 0.
For the new product we also assume that the firm produces up to capacity.
Similar to Farzin et al. [1998] and Huisman [2001], the state of the technology is given by a compound
Poisson process, θ = {θt : t ≥ 0}. We may express θt as θt = θ0 + uNt, where θ0 denotes the state of
technology at the initial point in time, u > 0 is the jump size and {Nt, t ≥ 0} follows a homogeneous Poisson
process with rate λ > 0. The later the firm adopts the higher quality the product has, so the higher the
demand for this product will be.
We denote the time of adoption of a new technology by τ1. When the firm invests in the new product, it
1This assumption is often referred to as the market clearance assumption (see, e.g., R. Deneckere [1997], Anand and Girotra
[2007] and Goyal and Netessine [2007]). Always producing up to capacity arises because firms may find it difficult to produce
below capacity due to fixed costs associated with, for example, labour, commitments to suppliers, and production ramp-up
(Goyal and Netessine [2007]). Even when firms can keep some capacity idle, a temporary suspension of production is often
costly due to, for instance, maintenance costs needed to avoid deterioration of the equipment. Therefore, in practice firms often
reduce prices to keep production lines running (see Mackintosh [2003], Anand and Girotra [2007] and Goyal and Netessine
[2007]). However, counterexamples to the assumption of producing up to capacity also exist. Hagspiel et al. [2016b] showed
that allowing the firm to produce below capacity leads to larger capacity investment while the effect on timing shows a tradeoff:
on the one hand the firm likes to invest earlier as the project is more valuable due to this volume flexibility, but on the other
hand the firm has an incentive to invest later because investing in a larger capacity is more costly.
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has two options. It can decide to either produce both products, or to immediately replace the old product
by the innovative one. In case the firm decides to replace the old product by the new one, the price of the
new product satisfies:
pR1 (Xt, θτ1) = (θτ1 − αK1)Xt, t ≥ τ1.
The way inverse demand shifts with X follows the real option literature. It started with Dixit and Pindyck
[1994], who consider P = XD (Q) with D (Q) unspecified. This variant, but then with Q being linear in
D (Q) has been adopted in, e.g., Huisman and Kort [2015] and Hagspiel et al. [2016b]. The demand curve
having a parallel shift, which would be, for instance, pR1 = X−αK, would require a completely new analysis
(for an application see Hagspiel et al. [2016a]).
If the new product is produced together with the established one, the demand system for the two products
is given as follows2:
pA0 (Xt, θτ1) = ξ0 − αK0 − βK1Xt, t ≥ τ1,
pA1 (Xt, θτ1) = (θτ1 − αK1 − βK0)Xt, t ≥ τ1.
The new product is horizontally differentiated from the old one, where β > 0 represents the horizontal
differentiation parameter. We assume β to be positive to reflect that the two products are substitutes. The
upper bound of β is given by α (β < α) meaning that it can never be the case that the quantity of the
other product has a larger effect on the product price than the quantity of the product itself. Besides β,
the mixeed terms in the demand system are also linearly dependent on X. There are two reasons for this.
The first reason is that the mixed terms in the demand system should be connected such that they can be
derived from a specific utility function (see footnote 2). Second, the economic argument is that, since the
products are strategic substitutes, when demand for the innovative product goes up, demand for the old
product goes down and vice versa.
2The demand system can be derived from the following utility function
U = ξ0K0 −
1
2
αK20 − βK0K1X + θτ1K1X −
1
2
αK21X − p0K0 − p1K1.
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The instantaneous profit function for the case that only the new product is produced is then equal to
πR1 (Xt, θτ1) = (θτ1 − αK1)XtK1, t ≥ τ1
while, in case that both products are produced, it is given by
πA1 (Xt, θτ1) = (ξ0 − αK0 − βK1Xt)K0 + (θτ1 − αK1 − βK0)XtK1, t ≥ τ1.
Regarding the demand we will address the following two cases:
i) The demand of the new product is known beforehand, and deterministic. Therefore, we have Xt = x
for all t ≥ τ1. We will refer to this case as the benchmark case.
ii) The demand of the new product is not known beforehand. It depends on, X = {Xt, t ≥ τ1}. Specifi-
cally, X follows a GBM with drift µ and volatility σ > 0, with r−µ > 0 3, where r > 0 is the (constant)
interest rate. Typically for these new products the market is expected to be growing. Therefore, we
assume that the drift is non-negative, i.e. µ ≥ 0. In order to make sure that the price of the old market
stays always positive, we need to impose the additional assumption r + µ > σ2. We let x denote its
initial value, i.e., x is the value of the demand at the time that the investment in the new technology
takes place, meaning that Xτ1 = x. This case will be referred to as the stochastic case.
Finally, we note that for the benchmark case, upon investment in the new technology the firm either
replaces the old product right away or produces both products, forever, due to the assumption that the
demand is fixed. In the stochastic case, the demand may fluctuate. Therefore, it can happen that the firm
first adds the second product to the initial one, and only latter abolishes the original one. Therefore, the
optimization problems have to be treated differently, depending on the case that we are considering.
In the next section we solve the optimal stopping time problems for each one of the considered cases.
3 Optimization Problem
In this section we derive the optimal decision regarding the following times: i) when to invest in the new
technology, i.e. determine τ1 (for the benchmark and for the stochastic cases); and ii) when to stop producing
3This is a standard assumption to ensure that the optimal investment time is finite.
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the first product, which is denoted by τ2, with τ2 ≥ τ1 (only relevant for the stochastic case).























∣∣∣∣Xτ1 = x]}χ{τ1<+∞}∣∣∣∣ θ0 = θ] , (2)
for θ, x ∈ R+, where χ{A} represents the indicator function of set A. In the benchmark case the process X
is constant and equal to x, whereas in the stochastic case it is a GBM with initial value x. Note that we
have indexed the value function by x as it explicitly depends on this value, which is fixed exogenously. This
will play an important role in the sequel, in particular, in the stochastic case.
3.1 Benchmark case


























where, in order to ease the notation, we denote the conditional expectation E [...|θ0 = θ] by Eθ0=θ [...].
Therefore, the decision between replacing the old product by the new one, and producing both, depends
only on the relationship between the revenues for each case. Moreover, the firm either decides to produce
both products forever (τ2 = +∞) or to replace the old product by the new one immediately (τ2 = τ1).
Indeed, upon investment (at time τ1) the firm should replace the old product by the new one if and only if
πR1 (x, θτ1) > π
A
1 (x, θτ1)⇔ x >
π0
2βK0K1
≡ x∗B . (3)













































In the stochastic case the firm needs to decide about when to invest in the new market, and also for how long
to produce both products. We remark that in this case, it can be optimal for the company to produce both
products for a certain period - during (τ1, τ2) - and then abandon the first product at τ2 and thereupon, only
































where, similarly to θ, we denote the conditional expectation E [...|Xτ1 = x] by EXτ1=x [...]. Denoting τ as
the time period in which the firm is producing both products (i.e. τ = τ2 − τ1), we, therewith can rewrite












































(θτ1 − αK1 − 2βK0)K1x
r − µ
, (7)
using Fubini’s theorem (see Hildebrandt [1963]) and the fact that the GBM has stationary increments. The
integral convergence is guaranteed by the initial assumption r > µ. Regarding the second integral, one
note in view of the strong Markov property of the GBM (see Karlin [2014]) that {(Xt|Xτ1 = x) , t ≥ τ1}
d
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ρSx (θ) = F (x) +




ε = δ(r − µ), (10)
and












In fact, in the stochastic case, the optimization problem (2) can be seen as two optimization problems that
need to be solved: one related with the optimal investment time in the new product (τ1), and the other
related with the time, from which on the firm produces only the innovative product (τ2 = τ1 + τ). Note that
F , defined in (11), is the value function for a standard investment problem, for which the solution is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The solution of the problem presented in (11) is given by
F (x) =





r x ≥ x
?
S ,







































Proof of Proposition 1 See Appendix 6.1.1 for the proof.















Next we present a general Theorem that is the basis to prove Proposition 2. We highlight that this theorem
is general enough to be applied in other stopping time problems that involve decisions regarding technology
innovations driven by compounded Poisson processes, as the problems addressed in Huisman and Kort [2004]
or Hagspiel et al. [2016a].





θ = {θt : t > 0} is a compound Poisson process, with rate λ > 0 and jump size u > 0, and g is a continuous
function. Let us also assume that
∃ ! θ? > 0 : h(θ) > 0⇔ θ > θ?, (16)







g(θ + n(θ)u) 0 < θ < θ?,







, where, for k ≥ 0, dke = min {n ∈ N : n ≥ k}.
Proof of Theorem 1 See Appendix 6.1.2 for the proof.

























for the stochastic case, respectively. Therewith, we can finally present the solution of the optimization
problem (2) including the exercise boundaries. This is presented in Proposition 2, for the benchmark and
for the stochastic case, respectively.
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ρx(θ + nx(θ) u) 0 < θ < θ
∗(x)
ρx(θ) θ ≥ θ?(x)
(18)






θ?(x) = υA(x)χ{0<x<x?} + υ
R(x)χ{x≥x?}. (19)
Moreover, for each case we have the following definitions 4.
• Benchmark case: x∗ is given in (3), ρx is defined at (5), and
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• Stochastic case: x∗ is given in (12), ρx is defined at (15), and



















where π0, ε, a and d1 are defined in (1), (10), (13) and (14), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 2 See Appendix 6.1.3 for the proof.
Proposition 2 presents the optimal value function, as well as the boundary curve, θ?(x). For technology levels
smaller than this boundary (i.e. 0 < θ < θ?(x)), it is optimal to wait with adoption of a new technology.
At the moment this boundary curve is passed, it is optimal to adopt the current technology level. Figure 1
presents an illustration of this boundary curve in the (θ, x) – plane (bold line). For values to the lower left of
the threshold curve θ?(x), it is optimal to wait with adoption and continue producing only the established
product. As soon as the technology process passes the threshold curve for a given value of x, it is optimal
to invest and therewith, introduce the innovative product to the market.
The optimal product portfolio decision can be interpreted as follows: at the optimal time τ1 the firm
invests in a certain technology level θτ1 . Depending on the value of the initial price intercept x, and given
4As we have been doing before, in order to ease the notation, we use the subscripts B and S to denote, respectively, the











Figure 1: Plan division.
the technology level adopted (θτ1), the firm will produce both products (for a certain time period in the








(x, θ) ∈ R+ × R+ : x ≥ x? ∧ θ > υR(x)
}
,
where in the benchmark case x∗ = x∗B , υ
A = υAB , and υ
R = υRB , and in the stochastic case x
∗ = x∗S , υ
A = υAS
and υR = υRS . The set Θ
A represents the region where the firm produces both products, whereas ΘR is the
region where it is optimal to replace the original product by the innovative. See Figure 1 for a representation
of these two regions.
In Figure 2 we illustrate the difference of the two cases regarding the technology adoption and product
portfolio decisions of the firm. Figure 2a refers to the benchmark case, should be read as follows: given
that the current technology level is equal to θ0, and the initial demand intercept is equal to x0, it is optimal
to wait for new technology improvements. When the level of the technology hits or exceeds the threshold
θ?(x0) (illustrated by the bold curve), the firm undertakes the investment. If the price intercept is such that
0 < x0 < x
∗
B , then upon investment, the firm produces both products. In case x0 ≥ x∗B , the firm replaces














































Figure 2: Possible movements of the bivariate process (x, θ).
For the stochastic case, we refer to the corresponding Figure 2b. It illustrates that, given that the firm is
currently producing according to the technology level θ0 and the initial value of the process X is such that
0 < x0 < x
?
S , it is optimal for the firm to wait for new technology improvements. When the level of the
technology hits or exceeds the threshold θ?(x0), the firm undertakes the investment. From time τ1 on, the
process X, with initial value x0, evolves, which is represented by a horizontal movement in Figure 2b. As
soon as the demand intercept process X hits the level x?S for the first time, the firm abandons the established
product and produces only the innovative one from then on.
Next we study the relative position of the investment thresholds for the benchmark and the stochastic
cases. First we compare the add/replace thresholds (3) and (12), in the two cases. The result is presented
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The replace decision in the stochastic case occurs for higher levels of the demand intercept
than in the benchmark case, i.e., x∗S > x
∗
B.
Proof of Proposition 3 See Appendix 6.1.4 for the proof.
In view of this result, it follows that for values of x such that x∗B < x < x
∗
S , the decision in the benchmark
case is to replace the old product by the new one, whereas in the stochastic case the new product is added
to the established one. However, unlike in the benchmark case, in the stochastic case X is fluctuating over
time, implying that there is a positive probability that the firm will still abolish producing the established
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product in the future, which happens once X reaches the level x∗S .
Next we compare the threshold curves for the two cases.
Proposition 4 For the same value of the current demand intercept x, the firm invests earlier in the stochas-
tic case than in the benchmark case.
Proof of Proposition 4 See Appendix 6.1.5 for the proof.
The intuition is that it is more attractive to invest in the stochastic case, because, first, X is expected to
increase because of the positive trend parameter µ, which means that expected demand is increasing over
time. Second, when it invests in the add domain, it acquires the option to replace, and the value of this
option is especially large when uncertainty is high.
4 Comparative statics
In this section we study the behaviour of the add/replace boundary and the decision threshold with the
different parameters and analyze the difference regarding, whether the demand for the innovative product is
stochastic or not.
We start by analyzing how the add/replace boundaries, x?B and x
?
S , are affected by a change in several
parameters.
Proposition 5 The add/replace boundary for the benchmark case, x?B, increases with ξ0, decreases for
α, β,K0 and K1, and it is constant with r, δ, λ and u. For the stochastic case the add/replace boundary, x
?
S,
increases with ξ0 and σ, decreases with α, β,K0,K1, µ and r, and it is constant with δ, λ and u.
Proof of Proposition 5 See Appendix 6.2.1 for the proof.
Proposition 5 shows that accounting for stochasticity of the new product demand, the add/replace boundary
is decreasing in the discount rate, while it is constant in r when we assume that the demand for the new
product is deterministic. The reason for that is related to the fact that by choosing to add the new product to
the product portfolio, the firm gets the option to replace eventually in the stochastic case. In the benchmark
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case, however, the firm would keep on producing both products forever. The firm has a higher incentive to
add the innovative product to the product portfolio if the discount rate r is small in the stochastic case. In
that case the option to replace eventually is of high value and therefore, the firm wants to keep this option
alive. If the interest rate increases, however, the firm is more myopic and values the replace option less.
Therefore, it is more inclined to replace the old product immediately by the innovative one.
The add/replace boundary naturally only depends on µ and σ for the stochastic case. Proposition 5 shows
that the firm is more inclined to first add the innovative product, i.e. x?S is larger, if the demand volatility
for the new product σ is large. Regarding the drift the opposite holds. If µ increases the innovative product
market becomes more attractive and therefore, the firm has more incentive to increase the instantaneous
profit of the innovative product by getting rid of the cannibalization effect. If demand uncertainty, however,
goes up, it is known from real options theory that it is optimal to delay irreversible decision. In this case it
means that the firm wants to delay leaving the old market. This implies that the add region gets larger and
the eventual switch to replace will occur for a larger value of x (i.e. later). Therefore, x?S increases with σ.
The comparative statics of the other parameters are not affected by introducing stochasticity for the
innovative product demand. We show that the add/replace boundary is decreasing in α due to the fact that
the old market becomes less attractive with a higher α, while the cannibalization effect stays the same. The
firm looses less revenue on the old market and therewith, has more incentive to switch to only producing
the innovative product. Regarding to the cannibalization parameter, β, we notice that the stronger the
cannibalization effect the less attractive it is for the firm to produce both products, and therefore, replacing
the old product becomes more attractive. In all previous cases replace gets more attractive relative to add.
Concerning the capacities, the add/replace boundary is also decreasing with both of them. The higher
the capacity of the innovative product, K1, the larger the cannibalization effect. This hurts the profit of add
so that replace becomes more attractive. Relatively to the capacity of the old product, K0, three effects can
be distinguished. Due to an increase of K0, the x
?
S decreases because the output price on the old market
becomes lower and because of the increased cannibalization effect. On the other hand, a higher K0 leads
to a larger quantity on the old market and this has a positive effect on the x?S . It turns out that the latter
effect cancels against the cannibalization effect. Hence, x? (for both the benchmark and the stochastic case)
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decreases because the market price of the old product becomes lower.
Furthermore, we show that the add/replace boundary is increasing in the demand intercept for the old
product, ξ0. The higher the demand intercept for the old product, the higher the value of the old product
and therefore, the firm is more hesitant to replace it so that x?S gets larger.
In the following propositions we present the behaviour of the investment threshold with the relevant
parameters, for the benchmark (Proposition 6) and the stochastic case (Proposition 7), respectively. We
note that the comparative statics for the investment threshold involves to compare curves rather than points.
Proposition 6 For the benchmark case, the investment threshold, θ?B, increases with δ, λ and u, and
decreases with x; increases with β in the add region, and stays constant in the replace region; increases
with K0,K1 and α in the add region, and does not have a monotonic behaviour in the replace region; stays
constant with ξ0 in the add region, and increases in the replace region; and does not have a monotonic
behaviour with r.
Proof of Proposition 6 See Appendix 6.2.2 for the proof.
Proposition 7 For the stochastic case, the investment threshold, θ?S, increases with δ, λ, u, and ξ0, and
decreases with µ and x; decreases/increases with σ/β in the add region, and stays constant in the replace
region; and does not have a monotonic behaviour with K0, K1, α and r.
Proof of Proposition 7 See Appendix 6.2.3 for the proof.
We now interpret the results of Proposition 7 (stochastic case). The results of Proposition 6 are mainly the
same in a qualitative sense, but there where they are different we explain why.
When accounting for demand uncertainty in the innovative product market, we show that the investment
threshold curve is decreasing in demand volatility of the innovative product market given that the firm stays
in the old market for a given time upon investment. This at first sight counterintuitive result stems from
the fact that, upon adding the new product to the product portfolio, the firm gains the option to eventually
replace the old product. The value of this option is increasing in volatility, which in turn increases the value
of investment and therefore, the firm is more eager to invest early. If the firm decides to replace the old
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product immediately, the demand volatility of the innovative product market does not have an effect on the
innovation decision.
The investment threshold is also decreasing in the drift, µ. The larger the growth of the innovative
product market, the more attractive the market is and therefore, the firm invests sooner. The same holds
for the initial value x of the demand intercept at the time the investment in the new technology is made, as
a higher x makes the innovative product market more attractive. This in turn means that, the smaller the
initial demand for the innovative product market, the better the quality of the innovative product needs to
be for the product innovation to be optimal.
As expected the parameter β will only affect the investment threshold when the firm will produce both
the old as well as the innovative product right after the investment. Since this parameter enhances the
cannibalization effect, a larger β makes investment in that case less attractive.
Moving to the parameters with which the investment threshold is always increasing. Regarding the unit
investment cost δ, we notice that the higher the costs for a given capacity K1 the higher the technology level
needs to be for the firm to justify investment. With regard to λ and u, θ? increases as well because it pays
more for the firm to wait for the next technology jump if this is effected to arrive sooner and/or when this
jump is larger in size. These results are robust for the benchmark and stochastic model. Furthermore, the
investment threshold is increasing with ξ0, as the old market is more profitable for a higher ξ0 and therefore,
the firm waits for a higher technology level to justify investment.
The investment threshold does not have a monotonic behaviour with the remaining parameters. In some
cases there are several effects driven the movements, which makes the interpretation very complex or not
understandable. Hence, in this case we omit an explanation for the effect of the interest rate, r.
In general the firm invests later for a higher α because it has to wait for a higher technology level to
justify the capacity K1. However, three other effects can be identified that in total could result in investing
earlier when α goes up. The first effect is what we refer to as the option effect. It explains that the option
to replace after having added the innovative product in the first place, is smaller for higher α. The second
effect has to do with the revenue before the firm invests. The higher the α the smaller the revenue on the
old market on which the firm solely produces before the investment. We refer to this as the opportunity
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cost effect. In Proposition 5 we have established that the add/replace boundary x? decreases with α. So if
α goes up it could happen that the firm changes from an add to a replace strategy. This implies that no
cannibalization takes place anymore and therefore, the firm will invest earlier. This is the third effect which
we call the cannibalization effect.
Finally, the investment threshold is non-monotonic, in both the capacity of the old and the capacity
of the new product. The investment threshold in the benchmark case is decreasing in K1 for low values
and increasing for high values of K1, following a typical U – shape with the smallest threshold value for
the optimal capacity level, at which the value of investment in the innovative product is the highest, and
therefore, investment optimal earliest. With respect to K0 an inverse U – shape can be observed. The
threshold is increasing for low values of K0 and decreasing for high values. At the optimal capacity level for
the old product, investment in the innovative product is the least appealing.
In the benchmark case we have a similar behavior for replace, but for add the threshold is monotonically
increasing in both K0 and K1. The latter result holds, because the deterministic demand for the new product
implies that there is no uncertainty regarding the value of the option to replace, which reduces this option
value considerably. Therefore, the cannibalization effect is the dominant factor. This cannibalization effect
increases in both K0 and K1, making investment less attractive. Hence, the threshold is monotonically
increasing in both K0 and K1. In addition, this effect regarding K1 is reinforced by the fact that for a larger
K1 the investment costs are also larger.
4.1 Numerical Illustration
In the following, we compute the thresholds for the benchmark and for the stochastic case, using the base-
case parameters presented in Table 1, which are similar to the ones used in Hagspiel et al. [2016b] and
Huisman [2013].
The corresponding decision thresholds are presented in Table 2. For these values, the thresholds for the
benchmark and for the stochastic case are not very different. In both cases we have the same decision
regarding keeping the old product in the market just after the investment in the new product.
In Table 3 we illustrate the behavior of the thresholds when we change the capacity before investment
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r risk-free rate 0.05
µ drift 0.02
σ volatility 0.1
K0 initial capacity 200
K1 capacity after investment 300
λ Poisson intensity 0.1
u jump size 0.5
θ0 initial technology level 1
x constant price before investment 1
ξ0 maximum willingness 30
α sensitivity of the quantity w.r.t. price 0.1
β horizontal differentiation 0.05
δ investment cost 100
Table 1: Base–case parameters used to calculate the thresholds
x∗ θ? decision
Benchmark case 0.33 42.7 add
Stochastic case 0.40 38 add
Table 2: Thresholds for the base–case parameters
(K0). The main conclusion is that when the investment in the new market is considerable larger than in the
old market (i.e, when K1 is considerably larger than K0), the decision in the benchmark case is to replace
the old product by the new one, whereas in the stochastic case the firm will produce both products during
some period. When K0 increases, both situations lead to the replace decision. We remark also that the
investment threshold is not monotonic with increasing K0, for both cases (benchmark and stochastic), which
is according to our findings of Proposition 6.









K0 = 25 0.92 38.3 replace 1.1 35.4 add
K0 = 50 0.83 40.2 replace 1.0 36.5 add
K0 = 100 0.67 42.7 replace 0.8 38.0 replace
K0 = 200 0.33 42.7 replace 0.4 38.0 replace
K0 = 220 0.27 41.9 replace 0.32 37.5 replace
Table 3: Behavior of thresholds with K0
results show that once K1 is larger than K0 (i.e., the firm is investing in more capacity) the firm replaces
the old product by the new one, both in the benchmark and in the stochastic case.
x∗B θ
∗





K1 = 50 2 31 add 2.4 24.8 add
K1 = 100 1 36 add 1.2 25.7 add
K1 = 200 0.5 36 replace 0.6 30 replace
K1 = 300 0.33 42.7 replace 0.4 38 replace
Table 4: Behavior of thresholds with K1
5 Conclusion
This paper studies a setting where the firm, currently producing an established product, has the option to
invest in a more innovative technology, in order to boost its profits by introducing a new, innovative product
on the market. Moreover, the firm may decide whether to add the new product to its product portfolio, or
to immediately replace the old product upon investment. In the earlier case it can decide to eventually stop
the production of the old product at a later point in time.
We find that if the innovative product market is more volatile, the firm has more incentive to first add
the innovative product to the product portfolio, and only replace the old product eventually. If the interest
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rate is larger, however, the firm is more inclined to replace the old product immediately.
Contrary to the standard investment problem, the investment threshold is not a single point but repre-
sented by a threshold curve. We find that the threshold curve is decreasing in the demand volatility of the
innovative product market, and therefore, the firm innovates sooner, given that the firm will be active on
the old market for at least some time. Furthermore, the threshold curve is decreasing in the initial demand
of the innovative product, implying that the smaller the initial demand, the better the quality of the new
product needs to be before it is optimal to innovate.
This paper is the first in a series of contributions that concentrates on when a firm should innovate and
with how much. At the same time it also has to decide on whether to keep on producing the established
product. The present paper focuses on the innovation timing decision and on the question what to do with
the established product. The plan is that follow up papers will deal with the optimal determination of the
capacity size for the established and the innovative product. It would be interesting to establish to what
extent our present results will change when the firm can control the capacities.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of the optimal stopping problems
6.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We want to solve the optimal stopping time (11), i.e.














The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB, for short) equation for the optimization problem is given
by
min{rF (x)− LXF (x), F (x)− g(x)} = 0
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x2f ′′(x) + µxf ′(x).
By construction, in the stopping region we trivially have F (x) = g(x). Moreover, the continuation region,
hereby denoted by CX , must contain the following set (see Øksendal [2014] for details)










In the continuation region the function F must satisfy the left hand side of the HJB equation. Let us
define ζ as the solution of the equation rζ(x)− LXζ(x) = 0, that is
σ2
2
x2ζ ′′(x) + µxζ ′(x)− rζ(x) = 0. (21)
The differential Equation (21) is a Cauchy-Euler equation, which means that the solution is given by
ζ(x) = axd1 + bxd2 , (22)
where d1 and d2 are the positive and negative solutions, respectively, of the quadratic equation
σ2
2

































Given that r > µ, it follows that d1 > 1 and d2 < 0.
We note that this optimization problem is in fact a special case of the case studied by Guerra et al. [2016].
The profit function g is a non-decreasing function of polynomial type, as considered by the referred authors.
Then, one of the boundary conditions is that the solution for x = 0 needs to be zero, i.e. limx→0+ ζ(x) = 0.
Therefore, we must have b = 0, and thus ζ(x) = axd1 .
As the value function needs to be continuous and smooth in all its domain and, in particular, in x?S , then
it follows from the smooth pasting conditions, F (x?S) = g(x
?
S) and F
′(x) = F ′(x)|x=x?S (for more details see
Øksendal [2014]), that x?S and a are as presented in Expressions (12) and (13), respectively. The remain of
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the proof is to check that F (x) = ζ(x)χ{0<x<x?S}+ g(x)χ{x≥x?S} is indeed the solution of the HJB equation.
For that we need to prove that:
• in the stopping region rg(x)− LXg(x) ≥ 0.
As rg(x) − LXg(x) = 2βK0K1x − π0, it will be positive if and only if x > π02βK0K1 . The result holds
in case x?S >
π0
2βK0K1





> 1⇔ r − µd1 > 0.
Recalling the d1 definition, which comes from Equation (23), we have




which is always positive. Thus x?S >
π0
2βK0K1
and therefore rg(x)− LXg(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ x?S .
• in the continuation region ζ(x) ≥ g(x).
By construction g is tangent with ζ at point x?S . Moreover g(0) = −
π0
r < 0, ζ(0) = 0 and ζ is a convex
function (because a > 0 and d1 > 1). Therefore, by Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004], ζ must be above
all its tangents, and thus, in particular, is above g.
Therefore, we conclude that F is indeed the solution of the HJB equation, which ends the proof.

6.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1




, for which the HJB equation is given
by
min{rG(θ)− LθG(θ), G(θ)− g(θ)} = 0,
with Lθ being the infinitesimal generator of the compounded Poisson process θ, Lθ l(θ) = λ [l(θ + u)− l(θ)].
In the continuation region we should have G(θ) = λλ+rG(θ+ u) and G(x) ≥ g(x). In the stopping region we
should haveG(θ) = g(θ) and rg(θ)−Lθg(θ) ≥ 0. Considering the function h(θ) = (r+λ)g(θ)−λg(θ+u), which
is continuous, and taking into account the Condition (16), we realize that h(θ?) = 0⇔ λλ+rG(θ
?+u) = g(θ?),
i.e. θ? is exactly the threshold between the continuation and the stopping regions. Given Condition (16), we
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propose that the continuation region stands for lower values of θ and the stopping region stands for higher




λ+rG(θ + u) 0 < θ < θ
?
g(θ) θ ≥ θ?
Using a backwards iterative reasoning, we can conclude that for θ such that θ? − nu ≤ θ < θ? − (n − 1)u,







This expression can be written in a more compact way as presented in (17).
To finish the proof, it remains to check rg(θ) − Lθg(θ) ≥ 0 when θ ≥ θ?, and G(θ) ≥ g(θ) when




g(θ + nu) ≥ g(θ) for θ? − nu ≤ θ ≤ θ? − (n − 1)u, with n ∈ N such that θ? − nu ≥ 0. In order to









g(θ + nu)⇔ h (θ + (n− 1)u) ≤ 0⇔ θ ≤ θ? − (n− 1)u.























g(θ + nu) ≥ g(θ) for θ? − nu ≤ θ ≤ θ? − (n− 1)u.
Therefore, we conclude that function G, given by (17), is indeed the solution of the HJB equation, which
ends the proof.

6.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Here we provide the proof for the stochastic case, as the benchmark case is similar and simpler. For the

























with x?S , a and d1 defined in (12), (13) and (14), respectively.





is of the same
type as that presented in Theorem 1. Given that ρSx is a continuous function, we only need to prove that
Condition (16) holds, in order to have the solution.
Let us consider the function hx(θ) = (r + λ)ρ
S
x (θ)− λρSx (θ + u), which can be written as
hx(θ) =


























Obviously, if x ≥ x?S we certainly have γx > 0. If 0 < x < x?S then, in view of the definitions of a and x?S , it
follows that 2βK0K1 − a(r − µ)xd1−1 > 2βK0K1 − a(r − µ)x?S
d1−1 = 2βK0K1(d1−1)d1 > 0. Therefore γx > 0
for all x > 0. Hence θ?x = γx is the only zero of hx, and hx(θ) > 0 ⇔ θ > θ?, which means that Condition
(16) holds. By Theorem 1, we conclude that function Vx, given by (18), is indeed the solution of the optimal
stopping problem (9).

6.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
In the proof of Proposition 1 we already have shown that x?S >
π0
2βK0K1
, which is exactly what we want to
prove here.

6.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4












S (x)χ{0<x<x?S} + υ
R
S (x)χ{x≥x?S}.
We start calculating the difference of the respective functions in the add and replace regions, namely,













Given that we are assuming that µ > 0, both previous inequalities hold for x > 0. Furthermore, both
threshold curves are continuous and decrease with x, then we conclude that θ?B(x) > θ
?
S(x), for all x > 0.

6.2 Proofs for comparative statics
In the comparative statics it is important to highlight the dependence of the functions in each parameter. For
ease the notation, when we want to emphasize the dependency of one quantity (a, say) with one parameter
(β, say) we simply write the dependency on that parameter, assuming the others constant (a(β), say).
We start studying how the parameter d1, defined in (14), change with the parameters µ, σ and r.
Proposition 8 The parameter d1 decreases with µ and σ and increases with r.














+ 2rσ2 . It is straightforward to conclude that d1 increases with r. It is also very simple











(µd1 − r) < 0
because r − µd1 = σ
2
2 d1(d1 − 1) > 0. Thus, d1 decreases with µ and σ.

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6.2.1 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof for the benchmark case is trivial, as the equation that defines x?B is easy to analyze. Therefore
we skip the proof. For the stochastic case, the calculations are less trivial and therefore we present them in
here.
We have x?S =
Kb
K1





. As Kb does not depend on δ, λ and u, neither does x
?
S .
Also Kb does not depend on K1, but x
?
S decreases with it. Obviously, Kb decreases with β and x
?
S , as well.
Taking into account the π0 definition, we easily conclude that Kb increases with ξ0 and decreases with α and
K0, and therefore so does x
?
S . To study the behavior of x
?
S with σ, we need to explore
d1(σ)
d1(σ)−1 = 1 +
1
d1(σ)−1 ,
as a function of σ. Given that d1 decreases with σ, then
d1(σ)
d1(σ)−1 increases with σ, as well as Kb and,
consequently, x?S . The challenging cases are µ and r.










σ2∇ (d1(µ)− 1)− (r − µ)
]

















, to which we can apply the conjugate and after some comprehensive
















] < 0. Therefore, we conclude that Kb and x?S
decrease with µ.





































]] < 0. Then, Kb and x?S also decrease with r.

6.2.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We want to investigate how the decision threshold, θ?S , defined in (19), evolves with the different parameters.
The functions that define θ?S , presented in Proposition 2, are elementary functions of the parameters, and
therefore their analysis is straightforward. For that reason, we omit these derivations.

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6.2.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Contrary to the benchmark case, the stochastic case the proofs for the comparative statics of the investment
threshold require many arguments, calculations, and we need to invoke an auxiliary lemma, that we provide
(along with its proof) afterwards.




















It is immediate to see that the derivatives of υAS and υ
R
S in order to either δ, λ or u are equal and positive,
and thus θ?S increases with those parameters, and that the opposite holds for x.








, showing that a decreases with ξ0











= (r−µ)K0rK1x > 0, implying
that θ?S increases with ξ0. Now we notice that υ
R
S does not depend on either σ or β, thus for replacement
the threshold θ?S is the same for any σ or β. The proofs for those two parameters are very similar.
Regarding σ, let us consider σ1 < σ2. First we want to discover the sign of υ
A






. We have that υAS (x, σ2) > υ
A







which means that the graphs of υAS (x, σ1) and υ
A
S (x, σ2) intercept each other only once. We know that the
graphs of υAS (x, σ1) and υ
A
S (x, σ2) are tangent to the graph of υ
R





where we already proved that x?S(σ1) < x
?























S(σ2), σ1), this implies that the graphs of υ
A
S (x, σ1) and υ
A
S (x, σ2)
need to intercept each other between x?S(σ1) and x
?







< x?S(σ2). We can conclude that θ
?
S(x, σ1) > θ
?
S(x, σ2) for 0 < x < x
?
S(σ2) and
θ?S(x, σ1) = θ
?
S(x, σ2) for x ≥ x?S(σ2).
Concerning β, let us take β1 < β2, and study the sign of υ
A
S (x, β2) − υAS (x, β1) = 2(β2 − β1)K0 −
(r−µ)xd1−1
K1
[a(β2)− a(β1)]. As in the previous case, the graphs of υAS (x, β1) and υAS (x, β2) only intercept
each other once; also υAS (x, β2) > υ
A





d1−1 5. Given that υAS (x
?(β1), β1) =




















S(β2), β1), and recalling that
x?S(β2) < x
?
S(β1), then the graphs of υ
A
S (x, β1) and υ
A
S (x, β2) need to intercept each other between x
?
S(β2)









We can conclude that θ?S(x, β1) < θ
?




S(x, β1) = θ
?
S(x, β2) for x ≥ x?S(β1).







< 0. Let us consider υAS (x, µ2)− υAS (x, µ1) = − 1xν(x), where




a(µ2)(r − µ2)xd1(µ2) − a(µ1)(r − µ1)xd1(µ1)
]
,






a(µ2)(r − µ2)d1(µ2)xd1(µ2)−1 − a(µ1)(r − µ1)d1(µ1)xd1(µ1)−1
]
,







ν has only one zero, changing from positive to negative. Moreover, given that υRS decreases on µ, we have
υAS (x
?




S(µ2), µ1) > υ




S(µ2), µ2), which means that ν (x
?
S(µ2)) > 0.
Thus, for 0 < x ≤ x?S(µ2), we have ν(x) > 0, i.e. υAS (x, µ2) < υAS (x, µ1). It remains to see that for
x?S(µ2) < x ≤ x?S(µ1), υRS (x, µ2) < υRS (x, µ1) ≤ υAS (x, µ1). With this we conclude that θ?S decreases with µ.
The behaviour of θ?S with respect to K0,K1, α and r depends intrinsically on the way the functions υ
A
S
and υRS behave when one changes values of the parameters. As some of the arguments are similar for all
these parameters, we propose to use y to denote one of the parameters under study.
In order to clarify the proof, we present a sketch of the basic idea. We start by recalling that x?S decreases




S(y2). In all cases, the following functions have
to be compared
ΦAA(x; y1, y2) = υ
A
S (x, y2)− υAS (x, y1) (24)
ΦRR(x; y1, y2) = υ
R
S (x, y2)− υRS (x, y1) (25)
ΦRA(x; y1, y2) = υ
R
S (x, y2)− υAS (x, y1) (26)
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In Lemma 1 we derive the following expressions
ΦAA(x; y1, y2) =





ς4 − ς5xd1(y2) + ς6xd1(y1)
]
− ς3 if the parameter is r
(27)
where ςi > 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Furthermore,




where, for i = 1, 2, ςi > 0 for K1 and α, and ςi < 0 for r. For K0, ς1 = 0 and ς2 > 0⇔ y1 + y2 < ξ0α . Finally,








where ςi > 0 for i = 1, 2, 3 and ς4 ∈ R.
Next we study the sign of these functions. When the parameter in study is α,K0 orK1, then ΦAA(x; y1, y2) >






= i1. For r, as limx→0+ ΦAA(x; y1, y2) = +∞ and limx→+∞ ΦAA(x; y1, y2) = −∞, it
follows that ΦAA has at least one zero. So, here we just consider the case where we have exactly one zero,
hereby denoted by i1. Then ΦAA(x; y1, y2) > 0⇔ x < i1.
For ΦRR the following holds:
• for K0, ΦRR(x; y1, y2) > 0⇔ y1 + y2 < ξ0α ;
• for K1 and α, ΦRR(x; y1, y2) > 0⇔ x > ξ2ξ1 = i2;
• for r, ΦRR(x; y1, y2) > 0⇔ x < ξ2ξ1 = i2.
Regarding ΦRA, given that d1 > 1, then it follows that limx→0+ ΦRA(x; y1, y2) = +∞ and limx→+∞ ΦRA(x; y1, y2) =




ς2(d1 − 1)xd1 − ς3
]







Thus ΦRA is a convex function, that either it is always non negative or there are two points, j1 and j2, such

















d1 − ς4. Summing up, if m ≥ 0 then ΦRA(x; y1, y2) ≥ 0 for all x > 0; if m < 0 then
ΦRA(x; y1, y2) < 0⇔ x ∈ (j1, j2).
In view of the behaviour of these functions, for α and K1 we conclude that: if m ≥ 0 then θ?S(x, y1) ≤
θ?S(x, y2); if m < 0 then θ
?
S(x, y1) ≤ θ?S(x, y2) when 0 < x ≤ $1 or x ≥ $2 and θ?S(x, y1) > θ?S(x, y2) when
$1 < x < $2, where
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• if i1 ≤ x?S(y2) then $1 = i1, otherwise $1 = j1;
• if i2 ≥ x?S(y1) then $2 = i2, otherwise $2 = j2.
For K0, if y1 + y2 ≤ ξ0α then θ
?
S(x, y1) ≤ θ?S(x, y2); otherwise θ?S(x, y1) ≤ θ?S(x, y2) when 0 < x ≤ $ and
θ?S(x, y1) > θ
?
S(x, y2) when x > $, where $ = i1 if i1 ≤ x?S(y2) and $ = j1 if i1 > x?S(y2).
Finally, with respect to r, we have the following behaviours: θ?S(x, y1) ≤ θ?S(x, y2) when 0 < x ≤ $ and
θ?S(x, y1) > θ
?
S(x, y2) when x > $, where
• $ = i1 if m > 0 and j1 < x?S(y2) < x?S(y1) < j2;
• $ = j1 if m > 0 and x?S(y2) < x?S(y1) < j2;
• $ = i2 otherwise 6.

Lemma 1 For the parameters K0,K1, α and r, the functions defined in (24), (25) and (26) are given by
(27), (28) and (29), respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1
• For parameter K0, let us consider two possible values, K01 < K02.




Note that a (K02)− a (K01) > 0⇔ K01 [ξ0 − αK01]
1−d1 < K02 [ξ0 − αK02]
1−d1 . Considering the















d1 + π0 (K02)
]
− 2βK01.
• For parameter K1, let us consider two possible values, K11 < K12.
6Note that we always have x?S(y1) < j2
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− [2βK0 − α (K12 −K11)].
• For parameter α, let us consider two possible values, α1 < α2.
i) ΦAA(x;α1, α2) = K1 (α2 − α1)− (r−µ)[a(α2)−a(α1)]K1 x
d1−1.


















> 1, which is always true because ξ0−α1K0ξ0−α2K0 > 1 and d1 > 1.














− [2βK0 −K1(α2 − α1)].
• For parameter r, let us consider two possible values, r1 < r2.




δ(r2 − r1)− 1K1
[
(r2 − µ)a (r2)xd1(r2)−1 − (r1 − µ)a (r1)xd1(r1)−1
]]
+λu(r2−r1)r1r2 .
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